"kids are different," and how the juvenile justice system currently functions.
This section will explore national and global tensions surrounding sentencing juveniles to LWOP. As to the former, this Note attempts to explain the difficulty lower courts have experienced in attempting to construe the Miller decision. As to the latter, this Note highlights the international community's disapproval towards the United States in sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
This Note concludes by explaining how the juvenile justice system is currently facing an opportunity for major reform. This Note proffers that it is in the best interest of our nation, and society as a whole, for this change to take effect. As a result, the Supreme Court must change its approach in deciding cases involving juvenile offenders, especially as it relates to sentencing them. Nevertheless, this Note offers various alternatives that exist in resolving this issue. Moreover, this Note suggests that in order for this reform to take effect, all three branches of the government, as well as school authorities and law enforcement agencies, must come together with one clear focus: rehabilitate juvenile offenders while also ensuring the safety of communities.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A DIZZYING PACE OF REFORM: FROM "INNOCENT CHILDREN" TO "HYPER-VIOLENT, MORALLY-DEPRAVED YOUTH"
The juvenile justice system in the United States has experienced a roller coaster, which has resulted in a dizzying pace of reform.
14 The first juvenile court was established in Chicago, Illinois, in 1899. 15 Since then, the juvenile justice system has been reformed four times; these four periods of reform have been characterized as follows: (1) the rehabilitative model; (2) the due process reforms; (3) getting tough on juvenile offenders; and (4) a window of opportunity for rethinking juvenile justice. 16 This reform is primarily attributable to the significant role that scientific research has played in influencing attitudes and shaping policies and programs.
Nevertheless, in the late 1960s, it appeared that the juvenile justice system was too aspirational and was not providing juvenile offenders with sufficient procedural protections. 24 This initiated the second period of reform, where juveniles began receiving more procedural protections. 25 For example, in 1967, the Supreme Court decided in In re Gault that juvenile offenders are entitled to the same protections under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is given to adult criminal offenders. 26 However, the third period of reform was triggered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when juvenile (homicide) crime rates reached a temporary peak, which the media categorized as "hyper-violent, morally-depraved, and criminally-involved youth, who were out to terrorize society." (June 27, 2012) , http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-roberts-courts-liberal-turn-onjuvenile-justice.html?_r=0 (noting that individualized justice for children was one of the ideals of juvenile court).
19
Id.
20
Id. 21 See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 92, 98 (2013) . 22 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 136-37. 23 See generally JOHN D. AND 24 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 35 (explaining that juvenile offenders had no right to an attorney, and the informal hearings in which their guilt was determined lacked the rigorous evidentiary protections of a criminal trial). 25 See id. 26 Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ). 27 See id. at 38; see also Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 14, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455  Concerns for public safety trumped concerns for due process or the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders. 28 As a result, states began adopting harsher punishments for juvenile offenders. 29 Accordingly, juvenile courts were divested of jurisdiction and punitive sanctions began replacing treatment and rehabilitation. 30 Consequently, the courts began transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal court system much more frequently. As a result, these juvenile offenders began facing the full brunt of adult punishment, receiving not only lengthy sentences, but also sentences of LWOP, and even death. 31 This "fast track to [a] states' harshest criminal penalties," barely resembles any remnants from the original juvenile justice system. 32 In 1996, in an effort to understand this dramatic change, the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice ("MacArthur Foundation") examined the United States juvenile justice system through the lens of developmental psychology.
See id. (citing In re
33 By carefully reviewing and analyzing both law and science, the MacArthur Foundation demonstrated that a fair and enlightened juvenile justice system must consider the developmental and psychological facts of adolescence.
34
Upon exploring the differences between adults and children, the study concluded that when children serve as criminal defendants, they are at a severe disadvantage because (1) children do not have the same abilities as adults to participate in the trial process, and (2) children should not be held to the same level of accountability as adults when they break the law. 35 As to the former, it is critical that a defendant in a criminal trial not only have the ability to assist his or her legal counsel, but also be able to participate in the decision-making process. 36 This is especially important in making decisions that are crucial to a juvenile offender's defense. 37 However, the study found that children are less likely to trust adults, which makes it more 10-9647), 2012 WL 135045 [hereinafter Brief for NAACP] . 28 Brief for NAACP at 14.
29
Id. at 9. 30 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 27, at 10; see Levick, supra note 14, at 12. 31 Levick, supra note 14, at 12. REV. 379, 384 (2013) ; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (explaining that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offenders). 33 See YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23 (explaining that developmental psychology is a science that challenges the current presumption that children somehow stop being children when they commit crimes).
34
35
36
37
Id. [Vol. 12:187 difficult for the attorney representing them to gain their trust. 38 Moreover, the study discovered that most children do not understand the concept and meaning of a "legal right." 39 The choices children make are all affected by their emotional and cognitive immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure, and their perceptions and attitudes concerning risk. 40 Accordingly, how juvenile offenders make decisions supports the conclusion that they are less responsible than adult offenders in similar situations.
41 This is primarily because children do not have the same level of competence or culpability as adults, and thus, should be treated accordingly in our juvenile justice system; hence, the notion behind "kids are different."
In 2005, this research took center stage in Roper v. Simmons, where the Supreme Court relied on scientific and sociological data, to find it unconstitutional for juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death. 42 In Roper, the Court explained that the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty with special force because it is the most severe punishment an offender can receive. 43 Five years later, the Court reaffirmed this "kids are different" principle in Graham v. Florida, where it found that a LWOP sentence for a juvenile, who did not commit murder is unconstitutional. 44 In Graham, the Court reasoned that LWOP "is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile" because " [u] nder this sentence, a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender."
45
The Court analogized LWOP sentences to death sentences, explaining that in both sentences, the offender will die in prison. 46 Thus, a LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile, and a LWOP sentence imposed on an adult, is essentially only the same in name. 47 Recently, in Miller, the Court held that sentencing juveniles to a mandatory LWOP is unconstitutional.
48 Notably, the juvenile justice system appears to be slowly coming full circle, where we currently find ourselves in the fourth See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2485 ; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016) (finding the holding in Miller announced a new substantive rule that was retroactive in cases on collateral review).
stage of reform, the "Window of Opportunity for Rethinking the Juvenile Justice System."
49

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eight Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."
50
In these cases, the Justices must figure out how to interpret the meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment." 51 The issues that arise in this context illustrate how the Court often engages in incremental decisionmaking, where it tends to limit its ruling only to the circumstances of each case, and one step at a time. 52 Moreover, in these cases, the Court often looks to its decision in Trop v. Dulles, which is considered the benchmark case for understanding the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment." 53 According to Trop, the Court must decide whether the punishment violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 54 Accordingly, since Trop, there is a presumption that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment will change over time, "as society's views on different criminal sanctions change."
55 Therefore, in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the Court looks to see "what people actually think." 56 Thus, in determining society's standards of decency, the Court employs a two-part inquiry. First, the Court consults "the objective indicia" of relevant legislative enactments and sentencing juries to determine whether there is a national consensus against a sentence.
57 Finally, the Court analyzes the penological justifications for the sentence and applies its own independent judgment to decide whether the punishment is cruel and unusual.
49
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 41. 50 U.S. Const. amend. VII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
51
Stephen Wormiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Defining the Contours of the Eighth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 11, 2011, 4:40 PM) , http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/scotus-forlaw-students-defining-the-contours-of-the-eighth-amendment/ (explaining the important and divisive role Justices play in interpreting, and thus, determining what the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" means in today's world).
52
53
Id.; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2470 Id. at 2466.
THE SUPREME COURT'S INCREMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND MINIMALISTIC BEHAVIOR
"The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our time."
59
As mentioned above, judicial minimalism is prevalent in decisions where the justices engage in incremental decision-making. Although the decision in Miller will be discussed more in depth below, this Note uses Miller as an example of judicial minimalism. For example, in Miller, the Court expressly limited its ruling to only prohibiting the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme involving juvenile offenders, and intentionally avoided the larger question of whether to prohibit sentencing all juvenile offenders to LWOP.
60
In analyzing jurisprudential philosophies, justices are usually defined as being one of four varieties: (1) 
61
Id. (noting that many of the great social programs of the New Deal era were legitimated as a result of majoritarianism).
62
Id. (describing the Warren Court as perfectionists and explaining that in the last decade, perfectionists have sought to use the Constitution to strike down bans on same-sex marriage, to create a right to welfare, and to give people a right to make medical decisions free from governmental intrusion). agree with how previous judges have ruled, they nevertheless respect prior rulings "partly because respect promotes stability, and partly because respect makes it unnecessary for judges to fight over the most fundamental questions whenever a new problem arises." 70 Accordingly, minimalists prefer to decide cases rather than adopt theories.
71
It is often argued that the Supreme Court is a human institution that must adapt to the changing conditions shaped by American society and policy. 72 The Court's role is noteworthy because of the difficult role it assumes in American political life.
73
This is primarily due to the controversial appointments of justices, the justices' struggle for influence, the Court's more bureaucratic structure, and the political controversies that are sparked by the important cases it decides.
74 Generally speaking, the Court's opinions serve as an institutional justification for collective decisions. Today, however, the Court appears to be acting more like a political body, making political decisions, where its power in selecting its cases enables it to assume a "super legislature" role. 75 When the Court is deciding major questions of public policy, it attempts to answer political controversies using the language, structure, and spirit of the Constitution.
76
The Court's power lies in the persuasiveness of its rulings and rests with other political institutions, and public opinion.
77 Therefore, because the Court is comprised of justices with sharp differences in approach, it has a tendency of behaving in a way that is likely due to its need to "muster the five votes," as well as the difficulty in drawing lines. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2477 -78 (2012 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 81 See id. 82 
See id.
this as the majority's way of "bootstrap[ing] its way to declaring that the Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibits" LWOP sentences for juveniles. 83 Prior to this portion of the opinion, the majority appeared to be going down a path where the only logical conclusion was that it was going to categorically prohibit all LWOP sentences. 84 Therefore, the dissenters argued, the majority's opinion merely paved the way for "further judicial displacement of the legislative role in prescribing appropriate punishment for crime."
85
In Miller, the Court could have-and should have-relied on the Eighth Amendment to explain how "cruel and unusual" it is for society to determine that a twelve-year-old boy or girl is so incorrigible or so "morally depraved" that they need to be locked up forever. 86 There are likely only two presumptions that can potentially explain the Court's approach. First, the majority only addressed the issue before the Court and intentionally avoided the larger question in order to pave the way for the Court to address it in a future case. In the alternative, considering the "need to muster the five votes," the difficulty in "drawing lines," or both, perhaps the majority only decided "what was necessary," to find the mandatory nature of the LWOP sentence unconstitutional. 87 Regardless, it is clear that these are just small steps that are likely the result of judicial minimalism. Id. at 2481 (using the word "unusual" as a synonym for "uncommon," Chief Justice Roberts explains how eventually, the practice of LWOP will become so rare that the national consensus of LWOP will be practically non-existent and thus, the Court will be able to make LWOP unconstitutional in a later case in the future); see also id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 84 See also id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 85 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 Ct. , 2481 Ct. (2012 478-79 (1966) and using it as an that all custodial interrogations created inherent coercion and required law enforcement to provide all suspects with a set of warnings before commencing custodial interrogations. 104 In clarifying this area of the law, the Court understood the importance of providing further guidance due to the confusion and difficulty that resulted from the case-by-case analysis on the "voluntariness of confessions."
105
The Court similarly employed this more expansive approach in Roper and Graham, where, among other things, the Court exercised its own independent judgment to reverse its position on the sentencing scheme at issue in both cases. 106 For instance, in Roper, the Court noted that "the prosecutor argued Simmons' youth was aggravating rather than mitigating, and although this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked"-such as the one laid down in Miller-it would nevertheless "not address the Court's larger concerns."
107 Therefore, specifically in regards to the juvenile justice system, because the costs and errors of these minimalistic decisions are too high and too risky, the Court must engage in a more expansive approach to further clarify this area of the law. See Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 99, at 826 (minimalist rulings may only be appropriate when they decrease the costs of decisions and errors). 109 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 Ct. , 2457 Ct. (2012 Id. at 2460.
108
THE MILLER DECISION
111
Id. at 2463.
This conclusion was premised on two strands of precedent. 112 The first strand focused on Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida. 113 Together, these decisions adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of the penalty.
114
The second strand was based on Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, which collectively required sentencing authorities to consider a defendant's characteristics and the details of the offense before sentencing the defendant to death.
115 Based on these cases, the Court in Miller concluded that children are entitled to an "individualized consideration" before being sentenced to LWOP.
116 Accordingly, Miller reaffirmed the principle that "kids are different."
117
Although the majority and the dissenters both acknowledged the "kids are different" principle, the evolving standards of decency inquiry caused a split amongst the Justices.
118 Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented, explaining that a national consensus existed because there was evidence of twenty-nine jurisdictions permitting mandatory LWOP for juveniles. 119 The majority disagreed and emphasized its narrow decision, explaining that a national consensus was not needed because it was not banning LWOP in its entirety, but merely requiring a sentencer to follow a certain process before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP.
120
The majority reasoned that states authorizing LWOP sentences for juveniles do so through "two independent statutory provisions"-one allowing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, and the other setting penalties for those who are tried in adult court.
121
Nevertheless, the majority explained, this process did not indicate that "the penalty ha [d] Id. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
119
Id. at 2477 (arguing that if 2,500 juveniles are serving LWOP, the sentence is not unusual).
120
See id. at 2471 (majority opinion).
121
Id. at 2472. 122 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 Ct. , 2472 Ct. (2012 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) ). [Vol. 12:187 vehemently disagreed and criticized the majority for imposing its own values and displacing "the legislative role in proscribing appropriate punishment for crime." 123 The Court nevertheless stopped short of banning all juvenile LWOP sentences. 124 Thus, Miller only requires judges to consider a juvenile's age and attendant characteristics before irrevocably sentencing the juvenile to spend the rest of his or her life in prison.
125
As a result, the Miller decision merely purported to "help" about eighty percent of the 2,500 juvenile inmates serving mandatory LWOP sentences.
126 However, this is more of a theory than a fact, because in Miller, the Court did not rule that LWOP is absolutely prohibited and therefore, unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders. 127 Instead, it explained that sentencing juveniles to mandatory LWOP should be "uncommon."
128 The majority intentionally left open the possibility of there being some "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty. . . ."
129 Therefore, the Court stopped short of banning the sentence in its entirety and thus, merely banned the mandated nature of the sentencing procedure.
130
ANALYSIS WHERE MILLER WENT WRONG
Although the decision in Miller signaled another step forward for the juvenile justice community, it was in effect, only a small step forward. 131 In its decision, the Court took a "decided detour" around the Eighth Amendment "kids are different" jurisprudence.
132
Most importantly, it departed from the precedent on which it passionately relied on.
133
For instance, although it relied on Roper and Graham in its legal analysis, the decision veered far away from the conclusion of those decisions. LWOP sentences on all juvenile offenders, which is a result both Roper and Graham reached. 135 A categorical ban on all LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders would have drawn a clear line, which is necessary to ensure these "cruel and unusual" punishments are not imposed on juvenile offenders. 136 However, the Court in Miller distinguished its decision from the one it made in Graham by relying on the fact that Graham imposed a "flat ban" on LWOP sentences applicable to only nonhomicide crimes.
137 Although the decision in Graham only related to nonhomicide offenses, Miller was not similarly constrained because both of the petitioners had requested the Court to consider prohibiting LWOP sentences for all juvenile offenders.
138
There is no reason, nor does the Court attempt to provide for one, as to why juveniles who commit murder are more culpable, and thus, distinguishable from those who do not. 139 Moreover, a central problem in Miller is that it requires lower courts to employ a case-by-case, individualized sentencing scheme, which is an approach the Court expressly rejected in both Roper and Graham. 140 In Roper, the Court originally considered individualized sentencing, acknowledging that it was a central feature in death penalty sentencing cases. 141 However, in rejecting this approach, the Court announced the "kids are different" principle and emphasized the potential risks that exist when the "brutality or cold-blooded nature of [a] Id. at 572-73. 143 See id. at 573 (noting "the prosecutor argued Simmons' youth was aggravating rather than FIU Law Review [Vol. 12:187 even expert psychologists find it difficult and refrain from attempting to differentiate between juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect a capacity for change, from those whose crimes reflect "irreparable corruption." 144 The Court thus concluded that states must similarly "refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation-that a juvenile merits the death penalty."
145 Accordingly, to ensure that no juvenile offender would be sentenced to death again, the Court adopted a rule, whereby all juvenile offenders were placed off limits. 146 Additionally, in Graham, the Court battled with confining the boundaries 147 of the LWOP sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders, which required "a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry."
148 In rejecting this case-specific disproportionality inquiry, the Court noted the potential risk of inaccuracy associated with attempting to distinguish between juvenile offenders who are incorrigible and those who have the capacity for change.
149 Furthermore, this approach fails to consider the difficulties associated with representing juvenile offenders.
150 Thus, the Court focused on protecting nonhomicide, juvenile offenders from being erroneously sentenced to LWOP because of the risk of a judge or jury finding the juvenile sufficiently culpable to deserve a LWOP sentence. 151 Thus, based on all that we know about how "kids are different," the Court in Roper and Graham rejected individualized sentencing schemes because of the risks that gory facts of a heinous crime committed by a juvenile offender would pose in a judge or jury's sentencing determination. 152 mitigating," and although "this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked, [it] would not address [the Court's] larger concerns.").
144
Id. (explaining the rule prohibiting psychiatrists from diagnosing patients under the age of eighteen with antisocial personality disorders).
145
Id. (prohibiting states from ending a juvenile's life and potential to attain a mature understanding of his own maturity). 146 See id. at 574; see also Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 504.
147
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77 (2010) (explaining how difficult sentencing is for trial judges, because they must take into account "the human existence of the offender and the just demands of a wronged society").
148
Id. (the case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry requires that the sentencer consider the offender's age and weigh it against the seriousness of the crime). Id. at 78 (explaining how juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system, as well as the roles of the institutional actors within it); see also YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 23.
151
Id. at 79.
152
Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 510; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (explaining how the defendant's youth was used as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (explaining how the sentencing judge found the defendant "irredeemably depraved," and "incorrigible").
Notwithstanding this, Miller neglected all the potential risks associated with such a sentencing scheme and "inject [ed] it into the very heart of sentencing."
153
Although the "lynchpin of the Graham logic" was based on the juvenile's "diminished culpability" and "heightened capacity for change," the Court in Miller disregarded the penological justifications that it had relied on in Graham.
154
Although " [t] he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory," it is not dispositive in establishing whether a sentence is justified. 155 Thus, a sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification, is in effect, disproportionate to the offense.
156
In fact, the Court in Graham explained that LWOP is "the second most severe penalty permitted by law."
157 In explaining the severity of a LWOP sentence, the Court in Graham compared LWOP to a death sentence, noting that LWOP: "[M]eans denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his days."
158
In Miller, the Court was correct in considering the penological justifications before concluding that none of the penological goals were served by the mandatory sentencing schemes.
159 Namely, deterrence plays no role in the decision-making process of juvenile offenders because they make impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions, which indicates they are less likely to take possible punishment into consideration when making such decisions.
160
Additionally, although incapacitation is an important goal because of the risk that an offender's potential recidivism might pose to society, justifying LWOP for a juvenile requires "making a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible."
161 Notably, this runs contrary to the notion that juveniles have "greater prospects of reform."
162 Finally, 153 See Berkheiser, supra note 63, at 513.
154
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2469 .
155
See id. at 71 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) and noting that the Court has recognized four penological sanctions as legitimate: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, (3) incapacitation, and (4) rehabilitation). 156 
See id.
157
See id. at 69-70 (noting that LWOP is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile offender to serve because he or she will serve more years in prison than an adult offender).
158
See id. at 70 (citing Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 526 (1989) ).
159 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2465 -66 (2012 . 160 See id.; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (Juveniles offenders "have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility."). 161 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72). 162 See supra text accompanying note 5 ("Capacity for change" is one of the three fundamental characteristics that make children constitutionally different from adults.). [Vol. 12:187 rehabilitation is a penological goal that forms the basis of parole systems. Juvenile offenders need and are most receptive to such rehabilitation. The absence of such rehabilitative services or treatments results in an extremely disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders.
167 However, despite the Court's understanding and awareness of the lack of justifications that make LWOP sentences inadequate for juvenile offenders, it surprisingly still believes there would be "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to [LWOP] ."
168 This narrow decision in Miller failed to offer any reason or explanation for its limited ruling, which in turn, has left many questions unanswered. The resulting effect of this decision is discussed in the following section.
MILLER'S EFFECT ON THE FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Those who sought resentencing under Miller faced a "head-on collision with everything Roper and Graham warned against."
169 Although Miller provided all juvenile offenders with the opportunity to seek a lesser sentence, it failed to ensure that this new sentencing determination was the product of sound and principled decision-making. 170 For example, because Miller only required sentencers to consider the fact that children are different, and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to LWOP, it failed to provide any guidelines for sentencing such juvenile offenders.
171 Accordingly, it left many questions unanswered. First, will it apply retroactively?
172 Second, will it apply to discretionary See Chang et al., supra note 172, at 92; see also Denniston, supra note 179 (explaining how Teague Doctrine requires a new rule apply retroactively in two circumstances: "first, if it is a substantive rule limiting the kind of conduct that can be treated as criminal or limiting a kind of punishment that can be imposed; or, second, if it is a procedural rule that goes to the basic fairness of a criminal trial."). Additionally, although recent studies suggest a "robust consensus" against the use of juvenile LWOP, 187 and boast about the "speed and consistency" in which states have responded to Miller, these conclusions are misleading. 188 The fact that states factually or statistically appear to be rejecting the idea of juvenile LWOP is not dispositive. These states may not be sentencing juveniles to LWOP, but instead, are in-effect imposing sentences that are the functional equivalent of a LWOP. 189 For example, it has been reported that since Miller, fourteen of the twenty-eight states that had mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences before Miller, have enacted laws "in compliance" with federal law. 190 These laws may appear beneficial to juvenile offenders because they restrict the imposition of a maximum number of years that the juvenile may be sentenced. However, they also provide the minimum term that a juvenile may be sentenced, which generally range from fifteen years to forty years. Id. at 6 (comparing the rate that states have "responded" to Miller to explain that it has been much faster than that of other decisions involving juveniles by relying on that fact that in the three years since Miller, an average of three states per year have repudiated juvenile LWOP). there being "appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty. . . ."
Minnesota interpreted Miller as a procedural rule, finding that
192 As the Chief Justice noted, this "disclaimer" was entirely unnecessary to the rule that the majority announced. Thus, a court in these states can still impose a LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender so long as there is nothing "requiring" it to do so.
As to the states imposing "extraordinary length" sentences, these states also interpret the holding in Miller narrowly, by finding that Miller only prohibited mandatory life without parole sentences. 199 These states argue that because they will provide juvenile offenders with parole at a later date, they are not actually prohibiting parole.
200
The caveat lies within the temporal limitation, which in effect, offers parole at a date so far in the 192 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2469 Id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
194
Chang et al., supra note 172, at 95-98. 195 Id. at 99-101. 196 Id. at 95, 98-99. 197 Id. at 98 (including Virginia, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). 198 See id. at 95-98. 199 See id. at 99-101. 200 See id. at 100.
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[Vol. 12:187 future that it will likely exceed the juvenile's natural life expectancy. 201 For example, in Florida, the longest sentence recorded was a ninety-nine-year single sentence.
202
These sentences are essentially imposing the same punishment the juvenile would have received had he been sentenced to LWOP. Thus, the juvenile is facing the "functional equivalent" of LWOP, without the mandated individualized consideration Miller imposes. 205 The sentencing judge should consider several factors relating to specific characteristics surrounding the child and the crime, such as: (1) the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the offense; (2) the child's background, as well as mental and emotional development, (3) the child's age and hallmark features; (4) the child's family and home environment, especially where it will help the sentencer understand why the child was surrounded by such a harmful environment; (5) the child's participation in the offense, especially with an eye towards whether peer pressure was involved; (6) whether any lesser included offenses could have been included; and (7) the child's ability to be rehabilitated. 206 Nevertheless, although it appears that Miller left the lower courts with some factors to consider, these factors do not address whether they should be considered exclusively, whether they are not mutually exclusive, or instead, whether the lower courts may consider only those factors it deems appropriate. As to the latter, this increases the risk that a sentencer will 201 See id. Id. at 101.
205 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 -69 (2012 . 206 See id. at 2467-68; see also Chang et al., supra note 172, [90] [91] subjectively choose which factors to consider while emphasizing the factors that appeal the most to him or her. This is precisely a risk the Court expressly warned against in Roper and Graham, when it rejected such individualized sentencing schemes. Therefore, without further guidance, the lower courts will essentially be able to continue behaving in a manner that ignores the constitutional principle that "kids are different." In fact, now judges have a list of factors that they can use to justify their decisions in sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP.
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM THROUGH A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE
The concerns stated above are further exacerbated by evidence of the juvenile justice system through a comparative law perspective. A close look at the Court's precedent shows that it has generally given some consideration to international standards as part of the Eighth Amendment's decency calculus in cases involving juveniles. 207 For reasons not explained, however, the Court in Miller did not partake in any comparative analysis.
208
The Court in Miller disregarded the fact that "the international community speaks with one clear, disapproving voice" towards the way our country treats juvenile offenders. 209 Nevertheless, before delving into why the comparative law perspective is so important in cases involving juveniles, it may be helpful to begin by first explaining why a comparative constitutional law analysis is appropriate and legitimate in the first place.
Constitutional meaning derives from the practice of argument and appeal made with proper forms, which appeal to the text, history, doctrine, prudence, structure, and ethos of the Constitution of the United States. 210 Thus, judicial review is legitimated by our adherence to these six different approaches.
211 First and foremost, a comparative constitutional analysis has influenced legal reasoning and judicial decision-making since the birth of the United States. Id. at 309-10. 212 Id. at 310. [Vol. 12:187 referenced foreign law 213 in an increasingly significant number of constitutional cases. 214 Therefore, the Court's precedent implies that it is appropriate to refer to foreign law in constitutional cases.
Similarly, it is not dispositive that the application of foreign law is not expressly discussed in the Constitution. Instead, the fact that the Constitution is silent on applying foreign law suggests that although it does not condone the practice, it does not condemn it either. 215 As former Chief Justice Marshall once explained, decisions of other countries exhibit how the law of nations is understood elsewhere, and how it will be considered in determining the rule, which is to prevail here.
216
Those decisions, he clarified, while not binding authority on United States Courts, merit respectful attention for their potential persuasive value. 217 Consequently, foreign law serves as a tool that can help the Court understand and interpret what is, fundamentally, American law. 218 For example, just as we regularly employ a number of various other sources, such as law review articles, books, other laws, canons of construction, legislative history, and common law terms of art, we should apply foreign law similarly.
219
In determining the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, "the climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment is also not irrelevant." 220 In fact, "[t]o decide any case, a judge needs to know certain things about the world; statutes and case law cannot be used to resolve legal disputes, unless on their own, they are applied to the facts at hand." 221 Accordingly, "foreign decisions may contain truths, knowledge, or information about facts of the world that are relevant to an American Judge."
222
As Justice Ginsburg has instructed, judges should make an effort to learn what they can from the experience and wisdom that 213 See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Law, supra note 209, at 748 n.5 ("Foreign law is considered to include statutes and cases of other countries arrived at after American independence in 1776. We think the term includes the writing of foreign jurists and scholars."). 214 See id. at 838-39. 215 See Silverman, supra note 210, at 319. Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's perspective on the impact international law has on U.S. law).
218
See Silverman, supra note 210, at 344.
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Id. at 310.
220
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 Ct. , 2033 Ct. (2010 . 221 See Silverman, supra note 210, at 334.
222
foreign sources may convey because they are helpful in what they should do-and more importantly, they are helpful in what they should not do. 223 Notably, relying on foreign law creates healthy relationships around the world, which builds trust and cooperation between nations to combat mutual enemies, and find solutions to the new legal problems of today that practitioners can all learn and benefit from tomorrow. 224 Additionally, applying foreign law is further supported in proportion to how recently it has found expression in the case law."
225 For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently invoked foreign or international legal sources to aid it in resolving constitutional questions in a number of recent cases, which represents doctrinal support for citing foreign law as persuasive authority.
226
This idea focuses on the "consistency, harmonization, and integrity of treating like cases alike."
227
Harmonizing our law with that of other nations allows us to achieve transnational consistency because "we are bound into a global community, especially on questions of fundamental rights." 228 However, historical evidence suggests that the application of foreign law should be limited to cases where the justices must determine whether a certain practice is reasonable, as it does in the Fourth Amendment context, or whether it is unusual, as it does in the Eighth Amendment context. 229 Specifically, " [w] here the text [of the Constitution] takes the form of determinate rules, an interpreter's discretion is fixed; but where it uses vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply them to our own circumstances in our own time."
230 For instance, in Roper, the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's dissent both cited foreign law, despite their disagreement on the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. 231 In Roper, the Court compared the number of countries that had executed juvenile offenders within the preceding fifteen years to demonstrate the existence of a virtually universal global repulsion toward executing children. 232 In comparing the evolution of the practice in the international community, the Court explained that referring to the laws of other countries 223 See Justice Ginsburg, Speech, supra note 216.
224
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See Silverman supra note 210, at 327.
226
Id. at 328.
227
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Id. at 16. 
232
See id. at 575-78 (majority opinion). and international authorities is instructive in interpreting the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments."
233 As a result, Roper serves as just one example of how the Court has consistently relied on foreign law; specifically, in cases involving the Eighth Amendment, which require an analysis into the objective indicia. 234 Accordingly, interpreting a textually indeterminate constitutional provision, such as the Eighth Amendment, in light of contemporary conditions, requires looking to external sources. 235 Therefore, relying on foreign law is especially appropriate in cases involving cruel and unusual punishment, where the Court is asked to make determinations of reasonableness.
236
Moreover, because "comparative analysis is emphatically relevant to the task of . . . enforcing human rights," applying foreign law is particularly important in these Eighth Amendment cases. 237 Therefore, applying foreign law to cases involving cruel and unusual punishment reiterates the following two important principles: (1) that our Constitution is a living document, meant to endure for the ages; 238 and (2) the formulation expressed in Trop v. Dulles.
239
Notably, the plurality opinion in Trop was not only important because it provided the benchmark for the Court in understanding the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment," 240 but it is also important because it serves as the beginning of the modern Court's reliance on foreign law in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 241 Thus, in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court frequently looks to foreign law to determine the evolving standards of decency in evaluating what punishments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. explaining its importance in relation to Miller v. Alabama and specifically, as it relates to the issues surrounding the juvenile justice system. As mentioned above, over the last seventy-five years, a significant number of cases have relied on foreign law in criminal cases. 243 In fact, most Eighth Amendment cases decided during the last seventy-five years have, at the minimum, at least impliedly or expressly mentioned foreign law. 244 However, the Court in Miller did not; instead, it ignored the fact that the United States is currently the only country in the world that is responsible for 100% of all the children currently being sentenced to die in prison as a result of their LWOP sentences. 245 Moreover, the international community has impliedly confirmed the Court's own principle that "kids are different," where most states 246 have either never allowed, expressly prohibited, or avoided sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP. 247 In fact, international law recognizes that sentencing children to LWOP contravenes society's notion of fairness and emphasizes the "shared legal responsibility" that society has in protecting and promoting child development.
248
Hence, there is a clear international consensus against sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP.
249
In addition to this international consensus, there are human rights treaties that prohibit LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in which the United States is a party. 250 Treaties are relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis because the United States is a party to several of these treaties.
251
As a party to a treaty, the United States assumes the responsibility of complying with such international obligations.
252
Moreover, under the United States Constitution, the United States must uphold these legal 243 See Calabresi, The Supreme Court & Foreign Sources of Law, supra note 209, at 846 (noting there is "scarcely a prominent Eighth Amendment case decided during the last sixty-five years that does not at least mention foreign legal opinion and practice"). 244 See id. This Note follows the international practice of referring to the nations around the world as "states," which is commonly done in the international realm. Id. at 1008-09. 249 See Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et al., in Support of Petitions at *6, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 . 250 See id. at *6. 251 See id. at *28. 252 See id. children to LWOP, indicates an international consensus against this practice. Consequently, the U.S. must make significant changes to ensure that juvenile offenders are proportionately sentenced so that it is in compliance with its international obligations, and in turn, effectively begin to display the "kids are different" principle that the Supreme Court has emphatically advocated for within the past decade.
ALTERNATIVES: A CUMULATIVE EFFORT
Despite all that has been said as to "where Miller went wrong," it is nevertheless a decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, it was premised on the "kids are different" principle. In addition, it is currently the only guiding decision on LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. It is also helpful as a starting point for a cumulative effort for juvenile justice reform. This cumulative effort requires the cooperation of all those involved with juvenile offenders. For example, state actors should do their best to give "meaningful effect to the substantive principles animated in the Court's prior decisions."
263 After Miller, state governments should have attempted to take "proactive" measures.
264 Ideally, state legislatures should have filled the gaps where outdated legislation prevented judges from acting.
265 Moreover, state courts should have re-analyzed previously sentenced juvenile offenders, as well as juvenile sentencing in its entirety. 266 Notwithstanding the ambiguities that resonated from the decision in Miller, one thing is clear: because "children are categorically different in the eyes of the law at sentencing . . . prosecutorial practices should reflect that interpretation of the Constitution." 267 However, it appears that this principle has "fallen on deaf ears." 268 If our juvenile justice system is to experience any real, positive change, there must be a cumulative effort on behalf of all three branches of government. To begin, our state lawmakers must accept their responsibility in taking the first step. 269 For instance, mandatory LWOP is a statutorybased penalty.
270 Accordingly, in Miller, the Court considered the objective 263 See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 184, at 788.
264
See id.
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Id. at 785.
269
See id. at 786.
270 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2471 n.10 (2012 . [Vol. 12:187 indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there was a national consensus against LWOP. 271 As a result, the legislature's actions and states' practices were a direct result of why the Court decided the way it did. However, as previously mentioned, although prohibiting or removing mandatory LWOP sentences is a step in the right direction, when these sentences are replaced with discretionary or extraordinary length sentences, the state is in-effect contravening "the spirit of Miller." 272 Therefore, in order to "embrace the Supreme Court's vision" of treating juvenile offenders differently because of their capacity for change, state lawmakers must consider alternatives to help juvenile inmates in the long run. States should begin by re-focusing the juvenile justice system to reflect its originally intended purpose: to be an alternative system to the adult criminal system, which focuses on individualized rehabilitation and treatment, civil jurisdiction, informal procedure, and separate incapacitation. 274 See id.; cf. H.R. 618, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015) (ending the practice of automatically holding juveniles, who are being charged as adults, in adult criminal court), and S.J. Res. 2003 , 216th Leg., (N.J. 2003 ) (increasing the minimum age that a youth can be tried as an adult).
278
See Drinan, supra note 184, at 793. 279 See id.
as well. 280 As noted in the cases discussed thus far, sentencing judges often have one of the closest interactions with the inmate and the case. This makes them more capable of ensuring first-hand that juvenile offenders receive a fair process. 281 These judges have the power of deciding whether to implement the individualized sentencing approach mandated by Miller by interpreting their state constitutional provisions in a way that either expands or minimizes Miller's reach. 282 Therefore, state court judges are equipped with the "tools" necessary to give substantive meaning to the Court's vision of juvenile rehabilitation, and the ability to ensure that such decisions are applied even-handedly.
283
Executive actors also share the responsibility of upholding "the law of the land" because of the important role they play within the administration of the juvenile justice system.
284
Considering Miller's mandate on individualized sentencing, executive state actors are uniquely situated because of "the executive branch's agility and discretion."
285 Accordingly, before a juvenile's case ever reaches a judge, state prosecutors first have the responsibility of charging and then subsequently sentencing the juvenile offender.
286
A prosecutor basically "lives" with the case starting at its inception and therefore, has the power to not only control the direction the case travels, but also, to ensure that the juvenile is given a fair and just process.
Specifically, prosecutors often have the discretion of deciding whether a juvenile offender will be transferred to the adult criminal system. 287 This raises an immediate concern for a juvenile offender because most jurisdictions employ generally applicable penalty provisions, which means that in a jurisdiction mandating juvenile LWOP, the juvenile can be sentenced to LWOP without his or her age ever being considered. 288 Additionally, some states have no minimum age standards or rules restricting the age that a juvenile may be transferred to adult court. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2473 ("Almost all jurisdictions allow some juveniles to be tried in adult court for some kinds of homicide."). 288 See id. 289 See id. some states, children as young as thirteen are transferred to the adult criminal system, where they not only sit in jail alongside adult criminal offenders, but are also tried and sentenced before judges who deal with adult criminal offenders on a daily basis. As a result, these children are prevented from receiving the very benefits or rights upon which the juvenile justice system was created.
Moreover, when deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to the adult criminal system, prosecutors are sometimes not required to take the child's age or maturity into account; in some jurisdictions, prosecutors are even able to unilaterally decide whether to file the case directly in adult court without providing the juvenile with a hearing.
290
This legal practice is known as "direct file," and it allows prosecutors to exclusively make the decision of where to file the case, allowing the prosecutor to act as both judge and jury. 291 Although the issues of transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal court system will be discussed below, the fact that prosecutors have the sole discretion of immediately and expeditiously controlling this process from the get-go, evidences the enormous amount of power they have, where they not only control-and thus, limit-the number of transfers, but also, are in an especially valuable position to protect the life of the juvenile offender.
Florida's "direct file" system highlights the need for change in the juvenile justice system. 292 This Note uses Florida to illustrate the many issues surrounding the "direct file" system that is employed by many other states nationwide.
293 Specifically, and perhaps most shockingly, according to a study conducted by The James Madison Institute, since 2009, more than 12,000 children were tried as adults in Florida. 294 This study analyzed the effects of keeping children within the juvenile justice system and concluded that sending children to adult court actually increases crime and 290 Tchoukleva, supra note 21. 291 reduces public safety. 295 Youth who are transferred to the adult criminal justice system are more likely to recidivate than those retained in the juvenile justice system.
296
The evidence overwhelmingly displays that keeping children in the juvenile justice system results in children being treated through a variety of programs such as, diversion, probation, redirection, and non-secure detention. 297 Ultimately, the study implicitly confirmed the Supreme Court's principle behind treating children differently. It determined that the juvenile justice system is more effective in promoting rehabilitation than the adult criminal justice system. 298 For example, a juvenile offender who is transferred to the adult criminal system is approximately 34% percent more likely to be rearrested for a felony than a juvenile offender who had stayed in the juvenile justice system.
299
Even more compelling, the study found that economically, a reinvestment strategy directed at keeping children within the juvenile justice system, while offering them rehabilitative and educational programs, would result in savings of about $12 million. 300 Although the reinvestment program would not immediately produce significant fiscal savings, these alternative rehabilitative and educational programs would ultimately result in long-term savings. 301 In emphasizing the competing interests between juvenile offenders and the public safety, this realignment strategy would focus on creating a system designed to address a juvenile offender's developmental challenges and opportunities. The results from these assessments would help determine the level of supervision and the types of rehabilitative programs that the child will need.
304 Therefore, the program would cater to those children who need more intensive supervision and rehabilitative services than others. 305 As a result, these children will be supervised much closer than they would have been in the adult criminal justice system, resulting in less recidivism, and in effect, more productive Florida's realignment strategy is consistent with the principles that the Court illustrated in Miller. Although the individualized consideration expressed in Miller runs contrary to the precedent in which it relied, and serves as a double-edged sword against juveniles, the use of individualized considerations in Florida's realignment procedure seems appropriate and effective. This strategy embraces everything the Court has expressed over the past decade in relation to how "kids are different." It does not limit itself to only addressing issues of sentencing or rehabilitation. Instead, it focuses on the entire situation: from the moment the juvenile offender enters the juvenile justice system, throughout the legal proceedings, and then at the end, when the juvenile is either sentenced, placed in in probation, or is order to receive services. Additionally, this strategy focuses on providing juveniles with the hope that someone else is "rooting for them," while also providing a realistic and viable opportunity for change and growth. 307 Here, "good behavior and character improvement" are not immaterial; instead, they are completely relevant.
308
Therefore, this program effectively balances society's concerns with that of a juvenile offender's, which, as mentioned above, was the focus of our nation's first juvenile courts.
Moreover, in Miller, the Court compared the discretion that judges have in transfer hearings with the discretion judges have at sentencing.
309
In doing so, the Court briefly addressed the issue of transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal system and acknowledged the "key moment for the exercise of discretion is the transfer." 310 It noted that judges often determine whether to transfer a juvenile based on limited information because judges usually do not know what they will learn about the offender or the case over the course of the proceeding.
311
Interestingly enough, however, the Court noted that when granting a transfer, some judges will do so based on the fact that the judge believes the juvenile deserves a "much harsher sentence than he would receive in juvenile court." 312 The Court
306
Id. (noting how more than seventy-two percent of juveniles transferred to the adult justice system are placed on adult probation, does nothing to protect society because in the adult system, probation has very little rehabilitative elements, and offenders are usually not supervised strictly). 307 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (LWOP "means a denial of hope; that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of the convict, he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.").
308
309 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 2474 . 310 See id. observed that judges often use their subjective judgment in their rulings. 313 In fact, the Court made this distinction in defending against permitting judges from making individualized considerations about the child at the transfer hearing. 314 So, why is an individualized consideration appropriate at a sentencing hearing, yet inappropriate at a transfer hearing when the same rationalizations exist in both situations? In its analysis, the Court in Miller appears to be undermining this idea, where it explained the risk associated with a child being transferred to the adult system unfairly and disproportionately. 315 Despite the Court's attempt to distinguish the two situations, it nevertheless concluded that the "discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult-court."
316
The Court somehow rationalized that permitting a judge's discretion would be better served at a sentencing hearing, which is the last and final stage of the trial process available to an offender. 317 However, this can hardly be seen as a "better substitution," when it is "the last and final stage," and where the only correction that can be made is at the appellate level. This is one of the most prevalent issues facing juvenile offenders all over the country today. It is an issue that must be addressed and abolished in totality. As the Court in Miller conceded, judges will inject their own subjective reasoning into their decisions despite the lack of information available to them. 318 There is no evidence that a judge who uses his or her subjective reasoning in a transfer hearing, where there is limited information, will not do so again at a sentencing hearing. Therefore, individualized considerations serve no purpose in the realm of sentencing juvenile offenders.
Finally, Governors can also play a role in bringing state practice into compliance with the Supreme Court's view on treating juveniles differently by using their "obligation to exercise mercy where it is appropriate," which is also known as the clemency power. 
314
See id. 315 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 Ct. , 2475 Ct. (2012 320 In effect, this would allow the executive branch to remedy several problems all at once.
321
Governors would be able to reach cases the courts cannot, ensure that federal law is applied even-handedly, and to avoid the "piecemeal nature of failed legislative attempts and wildly unpredictable court outcomes," all while providing juvenile inmates relief in an expeditious manner. 322 Accordingly, states have the power to effectively balance the public safety concerns with the need to treat these offenders fairly and proportionately. 323 In reality, abolishing LWOP only means that states will be providing these offenders, who were sentenced to LWOP as children, with a possibility-not a guarantee-of being released within their lifetime. 324 Despite the concerns surrounding the juvenile justice system, the states are in a unique position to take the lead and revise their sentencing practices to exhibit a growing consensus among the states and eventually align the U.S. with international norms. 325 However, in order to ensure that a meaningful effect is given to the Supreme Court's vision of juvenile rehabilitation and the "kids are different" principle, states must consider a "complete overhaul of juvenile incarceration" altogether.
326
Given all that we know about how "kids are different," states can no longer turn a blind eye; states are now equally responsible for ensuring that juvenile offenders are given the opportunity to mature and reform, as well as demonstrate these changes.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller signaled another one of the Court's minimalistic approaches towards redefining our nation's juvenile justice system within the last decade. Despite the Supreme Court's most recent ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the decision in Miller, nevertheless failed to account for other aspects affecting the juvenile justice system and those juvenile offenders who can still potentially face LWOP sentences. This decision not only runs afoul to its prior decisions in Roper
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See The Sentencing Project, supra note 178. 326 See Drinan, supra note 184, at 788-89. and Graham, but also to the penological goals for punishment and from a comparative law perspective. The decision in Miller detoured around the principle that "kids are different," and that children have a "diminished capacity that makes them less culpable" than adults. Consequently, states were left to interpret Miller's mandate differently, which in turn, resulted in similarly situated children being sentenced very differently. Our juvenile justice system has experienced a bumpy ride in the United States.
However, this is not dispositive of the Court's ability to clarify its decision in Miller and foreclose on the issues surrounding the juvenile justice system once and for all. The most important issue relating to prohibiting juvenile offenders from being sentenced to LWOP begins with the issue of transferring juveniles to adult court. Transferring juvenile offenders to the adult criminal system serves little-to-no purpose and considering the alternatives available, there should never be such an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying a juvenile offender's transfer to the adult criminal system; especially before other alternatives have been explored. Additionally, it is extremely compelling that the United States is one of the only countries in the world that does not prohibit, and still sentences, juvenile offenders to LWOP. By emphasizing the importance of parole boards and abolishing the transfer of juveniles to adult court, the Court could've satisfied the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and more importantly, followed the principle it has repeatedly emphasized in its decisions over the past decade: that children should be and will be treated differently and proportionately within the juvenile justice system of the United States.
